Friday 17 January 2014
Friday 10 January 2014
Analyse the influence of the Cultural Revolution on the arts and cultural production in China.
In 1968 Mao Zedong in his analysis of his
Cultural Revolution (CR) said that it was: ‘essentially a great political
revolution within the socialist system’ which would involve the revolutionary masses
struggling against the bourgeois elements in society.¹ Art and culture would
play a major part in this revolution, not only were the first targets of the CR
the elites of ‘cultural spheres’ but it also played a key role in advancing the
revolution itself.² Mao believed that revolutionary
culture was an: ‘essential, fighting front in the general revolutionary front
during the revolution.'³ As a result numerous artistic genres and other forms
of cultural production were geared towards creating a ‘lived experience’ of
revolutionary progress by making sure the ideals of the CR were reflected in
its production and consumption as a means of preparing people for the new world
created by revolution.⁴ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Centre wanted the
masses to take a role in this process of creation and consumption, telling the
rest of the Party to: ‘rely on them and respect their initiative... Let the
masses educate themselves in this great revolutionary movement.’⁵ It was hoped
that while taking part in this revolution that the masses would: ‘earnestly and
diligently, bring about a new nation-wide high tide in the creative study and
application of Chairman Mao's works and thought' in order to create a great
socialist China with modern culture.⁶ For Mao and the CCP to ensure this was
the case, a new government branch called the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) was established under CR
radicals like Jiang Qing, whose job it was to oversee and maintain the
ideological purity of China’s cultural production and consumption in conforming
to Mao Zedong Thought.⁷
By using a number of contemporary
sources and historiographical views from the likes of Clark and Landsberger, this
discussion will analyse how much the CR with its emphasis on the ingenuity of
the masses and the ideological control from CCP radicals influenced the Chinese
arts and cultural production. The discussion will not only take into account
the conventional CR time frame of 1966 to 1976, but also some of its influence
over post-Mao China.⁸
The Cult of Mao was well established
before 1966, with operatic films like The
East Is Red depicting him as a Supreme leader and saviour of the nation.⁹ Such propaganda enabled Mao to dominate China’s
culture with his charisma and makes it unsurprising that millions of people
would travel to see rallies and parades he attended.¹⁰ During the CR Mao was
trying to attack ‘bourgeoisie’ elements inside the CCP.¹¹ Therefore Mao needed
to show that he was the uniting figure of China and not the CCP in order to get
people to follow him and his ideology, which led to attempts to strengthen his
cult.
During the CR Maoist imagery and
ideology was everywhere; there were bus tickets with messages like ‘the masses
of people have unlimited creative powers’, mirror tables inscribed with slogans
like, ‘never forget class struggle’ and at least two billion badges with Mao’s
face on them.¹² Landsberger shows how daily rituals were created in order to
make him a figure of worship, such as replacing families’ domestic ancestral
tablets with ‘tablets of loyalty’ which had Mao’s image adorned with a halo.¹³ This created a culture in which
people were constantly reminded of their great leader Mao because he always
played some sort of role in the people’s daily lives.
Artistic depictions of Mao couldn’t be
done without much thought or ability, due to a required need to depict his
revolutionary spirit and natural authority over people and truth.¹⁴ The most
popular image of Mao was the 1968 ‘model’ painting Chairman Mao goes to Anyuan (Figure 1), which was copied over 900
million times and displayed nationwide.¹⁵ The artist, Liu Chunhua, said that
every detail depicted an aspect of Mao’s greatness and thought in some way, for
example:
‘His head held high in the act of
surveying the scene before him conveys his revolutionary spirit, dauntless
before danger and violence and courageous in struggle and in "daring to
win"; his clenched left fist depicts his revolutionary will, scorning all
sacrifice, his determination to surmount every difficulty to emancipate China
and mankind and it shows his confidence in victory.’¹⁶
Fellow CR artist Shengtian Zheng believes the reason
why CR radicals like Jiang Qing were so keen to distribute the painting
nationwide was due to the fact the painting romantically emphasised Mao’s
central role in the history of the CCP because the painting omitted other
leading figures involved in the 1920s Anyuan worker’s revolutionary movement
such as Liu Shaoqi.¹⁷
The CR would continue to make Mao the focus of
art and culture throughout the next ten years, being especially popular before
1971 when daily rituals and artistic depictions were at their most numerous.¹⁸ Landsberger
says that this strengthened Mao’s great leader status to the point that when he
called for a bombarding of bourgeois members of the CCP, the masses responded
because he had become in their eyes, ‘the CCP and all it stood for.’¹⁹ He also
feels this cultural influence lasted beyond his passing, pointing to a 1995
poll taken by the Chinese Youth Daily in
which 94.2% of the 100,000 responds named Mao as the most admired Chinese
personality ever.²⁰
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The art from this period continues to impress
too, for instance the Anyuan painting
sold for US$660,000 in 1998 and was declared a cultural relic, the first
painting to be declared so since 1949.²² The reason for this was due to the insistence
of CR pioneers like Jiang Qing that the art not only had to have a clear
ideological message the masses could understand but should also be of a high
standard to ensure it would be taken seriously.²³ Mao wanted artists to combine
realistic and romantic elements when making their work in order to be, ‘nearer
the ideal’, which paintings like the Anyuan
certainly achieved.²⁴ State-sponsored art during the CR was actually
propaganda, made in order to persuade the audience to get involved with the revolution
and promising a bright future in return.
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Jiang
Qing was assigned the task of overseeing the transformation of pre-existing
works into ‘model’ works in order to show people what the artistic standards should
be.²⁵ Figure 2 shows Jiang’s leading influence over the arts and that she is
being inspired by the ideology of Mao due to the fact she is holding his Quotations while instructing the artists.
Jiang said that all ‘model’ works should focus
primarily on fulfilling the taste of the masses.²⁷ By making gripping
entertainment the official art of the CR could influence people’s ideas about
the correct revolutionary ideology and behaviour by providing characters and a
storyline with a clear message.²⁸ As a result ‘model’ works were subjected to
years of revisions in order to make them perfect, for example the ‘model’ opera
Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy took
over four years to be declared finished by Jiang.²⁹
These ‘models’ were also meant to be stepping
stones in completely changing artistic and cultural genres in order to make them
focus on contemporary issues in order to serve the present. Making opera into a
modern art form was not only an ambition of Jiang’s but also of various art reformers
before 1949 due to the fact opera was seen as a ‘national genre’ which would
encourage the modernisation of all art and culture.³⁰ Before the CR numerous
changes had already been made to this genre which was steeped in traditional
stories and styles. The CR primarily sought to make these changes become the standard.
Operas were now much shorter in order to make them more fast-paced and
exciting. Western musical instruments largely replaced traditional instruments
due to their ability to create a more emotionally charged and involving
atmosphere. Military-style acrobatics were used to make the opera more of a
spectacle, much to the delight of the audience and traditional roles and props
such as emperors and swords were replaced by contemporary things like the CCP
cadres and guns in order to make stories have a modern focus.³¹ Operas seen to
not adapt similar changes would be deemed to be counter-revolutionary. As a
result hundreds of acting troupes were disbanded by the CCRG, leading to the
models imposing a uniform change on the genre.³²
The stories of ‘model’ theatrical works were
also changed in order to conform to the ideology of CR radicals as a means of conveying
their messages to the audience, for example feminity was seen as bourgeois and
a sign of continuing gender inequality.³³ Therefore the ‘model’ ballet The Red Detachment of Women keeps the original
theme from the 1961 film of the female characters fighting in the revolutionary
class struggle alongside men but it omits references to romance and family.
This is in order to show that women could be political heroes in their own
right and no longer had to lead lives determined by traditional gender roles
such as that of daughters, wives and mothers.³⁴ This could have a significant
effect on female culture, because women could now be thought of as militant and
independent, such as the rather extreme example depicted in the big-character-poster
in Figure 3.
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CR pioneers felt that in order to ensure the
dominance of the new, socialist culture; the old feudal and bourgeois cultural features
had to be destroyed forever.³⁶ Destroying the culture of feudal exploiters had
been an idea since the May Fourth era
and it was certainly pursued thoroughly during the Smash the Old Fours Campaign which was carried out by the Red
Guards but permitted by the CCP Centre.³⁷ In Beijing in the Autumn of 1966
alone 4,922 historical sites were damaged or destroyed along with 33,695 personal
antiques.³⁸ Post-1949 culture and art was also targeted by supporters of the
CR. For example one group of Red Guards called for an end to bourgeois things
such as; ‘classical books’, ‘tight pants’ and ‘magicians.’³⁹ Artists were
criticised for the style and content of their works, such as the President of
one art academy who was accused of being a spy, an accusation which attackers
backed by analysing his gloomy paintings which they said were evidence of his
secretiveness.⁴⁰ Clark says that the politically charged nature of the CR led
to the majority of artists being unwilling to try something innovative for fear
of persecution at least in public, which allowed the CR art to dominate China’s
mainstream culture during the period.⁴¹
To encourage
a new revolutionary culture created by the masses the state encouraged the
spread of the ‘models’ to localities as a means of influencing their
innovation. The number of Chinese cinemas grew from just over 20,000 in 1965 to
over 86,000 in 1976.⁴² This allowed Jiang to show China the feature-film
versions of the ‘model’ theatrical works which is the way most Chinese people
saw the ‘models’.⁴³
Amateur art
and culture was not only encouraged by the vocal support of the CR radicals,
but also the by the state providing the means to do so. In the village of Huxian the amateur
art classes run by the local brigade up to the 1958 famine returned in 1970,
with a greater emphasis on realistic painting styles and idealistic images rather
than the traditional brush-and-ink techniques. With professional help from
urban artists these peasants were able to create works that were celebrated in
national exhibitions and newspapers and eventually led to a local gallery being
made for foreign tourists in 1975.⁴⁴ Peasant artists like Liu Zhide learnt
their profession from such classes and he himself was able to earn national
fame for his masterpiece (Figure 4). The CR did encourage members of the masses
to participate in the arts and in culture, and as a result some were able to realise
their potential and enthusiasm.
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However the primary reason these works received
such attention from the state and its media was not simply a matter of artistic
merit but due to their political utility. Since 1971 the CCP was beginning to
pursue more moderate policies which moved away from the principles of the CR,
therefore its supporters did everything they could to show the CR ideals that culture
and art didn’t rely on the input of elites if there was mass participation.
This trend peaked with the rural village of Xiaojinzhuang being chosen to be a
‘model’ village by Jiang Qing in 1974 due to its political night schools,
poetry classes and greater female equality. For the next two years the village became
a ‘cultural theme park’ for tourists, funded and publicised by the CR radicals.⁴⁶
Despite the dominance of the CR over Chinese
art and culture not everybody accepted it. Due to the lack of new
non-mainstream art and culture during the early years of the CR, there were
people who had to find a different way of achieving mental satisfaction. Some
would search and hold tight to classic books like Dickens, Balzac and Hugo that
survived the earlier cultural witch-hunt.⁴⁷ Underground literature emerged,
where people wrote and distributed forbidden works which provided great
excitement to those yearning to read something that was written for personal
rather than propaganda reasons. This became especially popular to the urban
youths sent down to the countryside after 1968 due to some of them having more
time on their hands and not being under the watchful eyes of state officials or
Red Guards.⁴⁸
During the 1970s the influence the CR radicals
wished to have over people’s cultural lives was not as complete as they’d
envisaged. The idea that art was for the collective was being ignored by people
who kept their creativity private or continued to claim responsibility for
works they’d done.⁴⁹ Clark says that the repeated messages of the ‘model’ works
began to frustrate people, with common cynical sayings being muttered about the
predictability of plots, such as the following about stories of female heroes:
‘a big girl, wearing red clothing stands at the highest place, and points out
the direction we should go.’⁵⁰ Chinese people were beginning to feel that their
art and their culture was very shallow, unfulfilling and lacking in diversity
due to its nature as being simply propaganda, which is why the old joke
‘eight-hundred million people watching eight shows’ has become a common Chinese
phrase to refer to this cultural period determined by ‘model’ works.⁵¹
The CR did much to spread and encourage mass
reception, participation and enthusiasm in the arts, but due to the insistence
on conforming to Mao Zedong Thought,
artistic freedom was greatly restricted. Culture was also dominated by Mao Zedong Thought to the delight of CR
radicals, which only began to let up during the 1970s when control was relaxed
and people found ways of expressing their own individuality without the
knowledge of the state. After Mao died along with his revolutionary ambition of
creating a socialist equality with a collectivised culture, most of the
thinking behind the CR was discouraged by the new pragmatically minded CCP.
Since 1976 China’s participation in the global economic market has increased
leading not only to the influence of material capitalism in China but also the
influence of contemporary western arts and culture.⁵² However the event clearly
had some influence on the next generation of artists who acquired most of their
training then and the art and cultural relics from the time can become a
treasured commodity to be bought and sold, even if the ideals that led to their
creation are forgotten.
Endnotes
1. People’s Daily, (10 April 1968), in X. Gong, ‘The Logic of Repressive Collective
Action: A Case Study of Violence in the Cultural Revolution’, in K.Y. Law
(ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution
reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust, (Basingstoke, 2003), p.119.
2. Important documents on the great proletarian cultural revolution
in China
(Peking, 1970), p.126.
3. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1966), pp.299-300.
4. M. Gao, The battle for China's past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution (London,
2008), p.29.
5. Important documents on the great proletarian cultural revolution
in China
(Peking, 1970), p.138.
6. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1966), p.xvi
7.
R.
MacFarquhar and M. Schoenhals, Mao's last
revolution (Cambridge, 2006), pp.45-6
8. P. Clark, The Chinese Cultural Revolution: a history (Cambridge, 2008), p.1.
10. S. Wang, ‘Between Destruction and
Construction: The First Year of the Cultural Revolution’, in K.Y. Law (ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution
reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust, (Basingstoke, 2003), p.36.
11. Important documents on the great proletarian cultural revolution
in China
(Peking, 1970), p.127.
12. Gao, Battle, pp.20-9.
13. S.R. Landsberger, ‘The Deification of
Mao: Religious Imagery and Practices during the Cultural Revolution and
Beyond’, in W.L. Chong (ed.), China's great proletarian Cultural
Revolution: master narratives and post-Mao counternarratives, (Oxford,
2002), p.154.
14. Ibid., p.151.
15. Ibid., p.152.
16. Chinese Posters, Liu Chunhua Singing the Praises of Our Great Leader Is
Our Greatest Happiness, , http://chineseposters.net/resources/liu-chunhua-singing-the-praises.php
(26 April 2011)
17. X. Zheng, ‘Passion, Reflection, and
Survival: Political Choices of the Red Guards at Qinghua University, June 1966-
July 1968’, in J. Esherick, P.G. Pickowicz, and A.G. Walder (ed.), The Chinese cultural revolution as
history, (Stanford, 2006), p.103.
18. J.F. Andrews, ‘The Art of the Cultural
Revolution’, in R. King (ed.), Art in turmoil: the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, 1966-76, (Vancouver, 2010), p.30.
19. Landsberger, ‘Deification of Mao’,
p.139
20. Ibid., p.164.
21. Chinese Posters, Lin Chunhua- Chairman
Mao Goes to Anyuan, , http://chineseposters.net/gallery/e12-703.php
(26 April 2011)
22. Chinese Posters, Lin Chunhua, http://chineseposters.net/artists/liuchunhua.php
(26 April 2011)
23.
Jiang
Qing, ‘Reforming the Fine Arts’, in M. Schoenhals, (ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (London,
1996), p.198.
24. Important documents on the great proletarian cultural revolution
in China
(Peking, 1970), p.231.
25.
R.
King, Art in turmoil: the Chinese
Cultural Revolution, 1966-76 (Vancouver, 2010), p.7.
26. Crestock, Vibrant Chinese Propaganda
Art - Part 1: Revolution Revolution Revolution, http://www.crestock.com/blog/design/vibrant-chinese-propaganda-art--part-1-revolution-revolution-revolution-171.aspx (25 April 2011)
27. Clark, Cultural Revolution, p.27.
28. Ibid., pp.77-82.
29. Ibid., pp.27-9.
30. Ibid., p.14.
31. Ibid., p.33.
32. Ibid., pp.60-1.
33.
J.
Liu, Gender and Work in Urban China:
Women Workers of the Unlucky Generation (London, 2007), pp.27-30.
34.
B.Di,
‘Feminism in the Revolutionary Model Ballets The White-Haired Girl and The
Red Detachment of Women’, in R. King (ed.), Art in turmoil: the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76
(Vancouver, 2010), pp.199-201.
35. Crestock, Vibrant Chinese Propaganda
Art - Part 2: Seven Intense Years, http://www.crestock.com/blog/design/vibrant-chinese-propaganda-art--part-2-seven-intense-years-173.aspx
(25 April 2011)
36. Important documents on the great proletarian cultural revolution
in China
(Peking, 1970), pp.208-9.
37. Mobo Gao, 'Debating the Cultural
Revolution: Do We Only Know What We Believe', Critical Asian Studies, Vol.34, No.3, (2002), p.426.
38. D.D. Ho, ‘To Protect and Preserve:
Resisting the Destroy the Four Olds Campaign, 1966-1967’, in J. Esherick, P.G.
Pickowicz, and A.G. Walder (ed.), The
Chinese cultural revolution as history, (Stanford,
2006), p.65.
39.
Beijing No.26 Middle School Red Guards, ‘One Hundred Items for
Destroying the Old and Establishing the New’, in M. Schoenhals (ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not
a Dinner Party (London, 1996), pp.212-222.
40. Zheng, ‘Passion, Reflection,
Survival’, p.97.
41. Clark, Cultural Revolution, p.251.
42. Gao, Battle, p.28.
43. Clark, Cultural Revolution, p.159.
44. R. Croizier, ‘Hu Xian Peasant
Painting: From Revolutionary Icon to Market Commodity’, in R. King (ed.), Art in turmoil: the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, 1966-76, (Vancouver, 2010), pp.138-147.
45. Chinese Posters, Huxian Peasant
Painters, http://chineseposters.net/themes/huxian-peasant-painters.php(26 April 2011)
46.
J.
Brown, ‘Staging Xiaojinzhuang: The City in the Countryside’, in J. Esherick,
P.G. Pickowicz, and A.G. Walder (ed.), The
Chinese cultural revolution as history, (Stanford,
2006), p.162-4.
47. Clark, Cultural Revolution, p.228.
48. Ibid., pp.226-30.
49. Ibid., p.236.
50. Ibid., p.49.
51. Ibid., p.2.
52.
G.R.
Barme, In the Red: On Contemporary
Chinese Culture (New York, 1999), p.202, p.268
Red Means Go: the mentalities of the Cultural Revolution
INTRODUCTION
The Cultural Revolution was initiated by the May 16th
Notification, which called for CCP members to, ‘...hold high the great banner
of the Great Proletarian Revolution...’ as a means of exposing opponents of
socialism within culture.¹
The Ninth Party Congress in 1969 suggested the Cultural Revolution was
concluded through claiming it had ‘...won great victory.’² However the official line taken by the CCP now actually puts
the revolution’s ending as 1976 after the arrest of the Gang of Four.³ Mao himself did not believe the Revolution ended in 1969,
allegedly saying to colleagues in January 1976 “The Great Cultural Revolution
is something that has not yet been concluded. Thus I am passing the task on to
the next generation.”⁴ In fact his successors reversed the
trends of the Cultural Revolution and actually brought in the liberal economic
reforms that Mao completely opposed.⁵
The Cultural Revolution had one overarching aim of trying to
stop revisionism within China, as evidenced by the following 1969 report from the Ninth Party
Congress: “The current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is absolutely
necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the
proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism.”⁶ Mao also declared that these ideological aims meant that
politics would lead the Revolution:
“The Cultural Revolution is essentially a great political
revolution within the socialist system, of the proletariat against the
bourgeoisie. It is the continuity of the long-term struggle between the
revolutionary masses, led by the CCP and the Nationalist reactionaries, and the
continuity of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.” ⁷
The Cultural Revolution did indeed witness political change and
as the declaration also notes the mobilization of the revolutionary masses in
class struggle, which had been a traditional feature of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) since it’s founding. As before the masses would be empowered to
take a role in advancing the revolution throughout all the levels of society.
Culture did play a part in the Cultural Revolution because Mao realised it was
necessary in order to promote the ideals of the political and social
revolution, “Works of literature and art, as ideological forms, are products of
the reflection in the human brain of the life of a given society.”⁸
A chapter will be dedicated to each of these topics as a
means of assessing the motivations and mentalities of contemporary agents. The
first chapter will focus on the motivations of Mao Zedong and other members of
the CCP in launching and maintaining the Cultural Revolution throughout these
ten years. The second chapter will focus on how various artistic forms were
handled and judged throughout these years in accordance to the wishes of Mao Zedong Thought. The final chapter
will then analyse how these changes in politics and culture affected the
mentalities of the people within the PRC.
Chapter 1- Mao and
the CCP
Threats to Mao from the Party Centre
Mao was growing increasingly pessimistic about the fate of
communism in China in the years before the Cultural Revolution. His previous
convictions about the inevitable triumph of communism were giving way to
increasing paranoia about the need to preserve the gains of the revolution: “If
it is badly handled there is always the danger of a capitalist restoration. All
members of the party and all the people ... must never relax their vigilance.”¹ Mao feared that the gains of the masses were being lost to
increasing bureaucracy, which he felt were indications of the re-emergence of capitalism. In
1964 he said the following of the newly emerged bureaucratic class: “These
people are opposed to the working class and poor and lower-middle peasants.
These people have become or are in the process of becoming bourgeois elements
sucking the blood of the workers.”² Mao felt powerless when thinking
about an uncertain future and the fact the socialist equality he wanted was
under threat from elitist exploitation.
Despite being Chairman, Mao’s role in the CCP had decreased
since the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1959. Instead, policy-making and
decisions were now largely the responsibility of his vice-Chairmen Liu Shaoqi
and Deng Xiaoping.³ Mao’s emphasis on ideology was not
something that Liu and Deng conformed to, for example Liu interrupted Mao in a
meeting in 1964 to tell him that, “It may be better to go about resolving
concrete problems, regardless of the fundamental nature of the contradictions
involved.”⁴ The Soviet model had been very influential on the governance
of the PRC since its conception. However between 1953 and 1964 Russia had
witnessed the cult of Stalin being deconstructed, the emergence of an elite
bureaucratic class and the deposition of Khrushchev. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals
believe this made Mao increasingly nervous about his supreme leadership and
legacy which could be dismantled whether he was dead or alive like these two
great leaders had been.⁵ The behaviour of his vice-Chairman
may have made him feel like he was about to share the fate of Khrushchev,
responding to Liu’s interruption at the 1964 meeting by asking, “Do I have any
rights at all?”⁶ These potential threats to Mao’s
legacy and position made him feel the need to strike back against revisionists
like Liu and Deng and the rightist system which they encouraged inside the CCP.
First to Fall
In 1965 Mao secretly supported an article by Yao Wenyuan
criticising an opera by Wu Han which Mao interpreted as a criticism against
himself, however criticising blasphemy wasn’t the primary motive; in actual
fact the motive was political. Wu was vice-mayor of the Beijing Municipal
government which was headed by Peng Zhen, who in turn played a key role in
Deng’s Central Secretariat which Mao wanted to dismantle.⁷ The opera was allowed under Peng’s jurisdiction and was
therefore seen as a sign either of his ineptitude to recognise revisionist
culture or of his sympathy for critics of Mao.⁸ Mao got the national press to drum
up criticism against the ‘black gang’ that was the Beijing Municipal
government, leading to a mass campaign against them.⁹ People were genuinely enraged by what they read, a member of
the mob that attacked Wu Han’s house recalled, “How could we stand idly by,
doing nothing, if so many years after Liberation there were still people in the
capital who attacked our Great Leader by innuendo?”¹⁰
All of this criticism from the masses and members of the CCP
led to the May 16th Notification which dismissed Peng, Wu and their
allies from the CCP. ¹¹ The Notification made the call for
people to target, “Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked
into the Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture are a
bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists.”¹²
The Notification also
led to the establishment of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG), which
was headed by Chen Boda, Kang Sheng and Madame Mao (Jiang Qing). This group
would serve as Mao’s personal instrument for writing most of the official
Cultural Revolution literature, allowing him to make his condemnations of
revisionists and to praise those who attacked them.¹³ Mao had created a climate of suspicion in which figures of
authority could be targeted and made suspected revisionists vulnerable to the
criticism of the masses.
Reprimanding Liu Shaoqi
The May 16th Notification highlighted education as
being a section of society most under the influence of the bourgeois academics
and revisionist CCP officials.¹⁴ In May 1966, Kang Sheng secretly
encouraged the leftists of Peking University to criticise the CCP and academic
authorities there. They responded by setting up thousands of
big-character-posters making accusations against the authorities for their
links to Peng Zhen which suggested they were opposed to the Cultural
Revolution.¹⁵ By the end of the month newspapers and radio stations under
the covert control of Mao and the CCRG were spreading the messages on these
posters nationwide, thus leading to other Universities and units carrying out
similar poster campaigns against local authorities.¹⁶ In response to the chaos on university campuses, work teams
were sent in as a means of the CCP Centre regaining control over the situation.
The work teams were under the authority of Liu Shaoqi and Deng, both of whom
felt that the rebels were simply rightists trying to exploit the Cultural
Revolution atmosphere and as a result Liu ordered the work teams to protect the
CCP officials and to curb rebel activity.¹⁷ For several weeks there were
arguments at the CCP Centre over whether the work teams should have been
deployed to deal with in revolting departments or not.¹⁸ When Mao returned to Beijing he made his position very
clear: “Covering up big-character-posters is something that cannot be
permitted. It’s an error in orientation that must be rectified right away. All
these restrictions must be smashed to pieces... Those who suppress the student
movement will come to no good end!”¹⁹ Nobody opposed Mao’s decision and
this led to the immediate removal of the work teams from schools. At a mass
rally to the revolutionary students and teachers the CCP Centre declared its
support for the masses with Liu declaring:
“How to carry the
Cultural Revolution forward? You do not know, then come to ask us. To be honest
with you, I do not know either. I believe that many comrades at the Centre, and
most of the work team members have no ready answer about this question... It
seems that we old revolutionaries now are encountering new problems so that
sometimes we are criticized for having made mistakes. But we are baffled by not
knowing what we have done wrong.”²⁰
The dispute at the Centre over
whether the revolution needed to be controlled or autonomous was only settled
by Mao’s intervention, however it is clear that such orders were not followed
due to an agreement of ideas but compliance as is evident of Liu’s ‘baffled’
self-criticism. The supreme leadership of Mao was still strong in the CCP. Liu
was eventually dismissed from the Party at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969
after a CCP Centre report confirmed ‘with full supporting evidence’ that Liu
was a ‘renegade’ with links to ‘modern revisionism and the Kuomintang
reactionaries.’ These statements are not confirmed by any evidence which
strongly suggests they were actually fabricated and the fact this report was
created under Mao’s supervision implies that he wanted to get rid of Liu.²¹ Mao decided what was right and wrong for the Party and the
fact he could make such decisions on personal opinions led to many cadres
feeling paranoid about needing to openly conform with Mao.
Mao’s victory over the matter of the
work teams reaffirmed his authority which gave him the confidence to launch an
open attack against Liu’s position, saying in his Bombard The Headquarters big-character-poster that ‘some leading
comrades from the central down to local levels’ had taken ‘the reactionary
stand of the bourgeoisie’ in not only the matter of the work teams but also in
Party deviations to the right in 1962 and 1964.²² Mao had declared that the
revolutionary masses needed to play a role in the dismantling the CCP system
which reactionaries like Liu had led astray. Mao’s official recognition of the
Red Guard movement in July 1966 and of the revolutionary mass organizations of
workers and peasants in November 1966 provided the masses with a means to
coordinate bombardments against the CCP.²³
Mao wanted the assaults against the revisionists to be in the hands of the
masses because then it would appear to be the will of the people rather than
his own paranoia.
Bombarding of the Headquarters
Mao didn’t just want to purge the CCP and replace its
members; he declared he wanted to destroy the elitist system which had been
made by men like Liu:
“Although socialism eliminates class,
in its process of development some problems of groups with vested interests
still persist. These groups are satisfied with the system advantageous to them
and are not willing to change it... If one wants to establish a new system, one
must always destroy the old system.”²⁴
Every provincial government was rebelled against and in the
vast majority of cases the rebels emerged victorious. This process began in
Shanghai when revolutionary workers and students led by members of the CCRG
seized power from the municipal government.²⁵ Then came the task of creating a new
local government. At first a system of communes with delegates elected by the
revolutionary masses was envisaged by the CCP Centre.²⁶ However in early 1967 Mao backed away from this, preferring
to reaffirm his commitment to ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’²⁷ which emphasised the need to “suppress those who try to wreck
our socialist construction.”²⁸ This retreat from communes was probably due to Mao losing
faith in the ability of the revolutionary masses to unite in efforts to
construct the new political system. Such an impression emerged due to
factionalism between revolutionary mass organizations becoming a feature of
every province, resulting in power struggles which usually led to massive violence.²⁹ In 1969 Mao spoke out against the contradictions that had
emerged amongst the revolutionary masses: “For the sake of victory, more people
need to be united.”³⁰ Since 1967 the CCP Centre had tried to make
sure these struggles ended in victory for the Leftists by ordering the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to: “...resolutely support and help the proletarian
revolutionary Leftists” and to “not be
an air-raid shelter for a handful of Party-persons in power taking the
capitalists road.”³¹ However this didn’t settle local factional
disputes because the order still gave room for interpretation as it didn’t
define or label such people. As discussed before it only became clear that Liu
Shaoqi was a ‘renegade’ once Mao had branded him so. For the majority of cases
the legitimate revolutionary power-holders were decided by the Party Centre,
who would ratify the authority of victorious factions or would oversee
negotiations between two factions.³² Once this was decided the PLA would
be able to secure the victory of one of the revolutionary factions.
The reaffirmation of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’
ideal didn’t result in the provincial government system remaining unchanged.
Nationwide the amount of personnel within ministries was massively reduced in
size and by 1968 between 70% and 90% of the original employees of most
ministries had been “sent down” for re-education at the “May 7 Cadre Schools.”³³ Revolutionary Committees emerged as a standard system for
each province whose leaders were chosen from amongst three separate groups:
‘...the leaders of revolutionary mass organizations that truly represent the
broad masses, the representatives of the PLA units stationed in the area, and
the revolutionary leading cadres. None of these three bodies can be excluded.”³⁴
Mao believed that the masses were unified in their goal to
advance the revolution, which is why he gave them the freedom to destroy the
old system and build a new one which was more representative of popular will
than the previous elitist system. When it emerged this would not be the case
the Chinese political system had to rely on the PLA and Party Centre to rebuild
it.
Reducing the Excesses
The fact the state system had been crippled by continuous
power-struggles meant that the flow of information between the Centre and the
localities was severed, and as a result the ability of the Centre to intervene
in local issues was often curtailed.³⁵ People were therefore unsure about
what the Centre expected from them. In fact when Mao tried to send a work team
into Qinghua University in 1968 to sort out fighting between Red Guard
factions, it was repulsed by the rebels. Mao consequently told the Red Guards
their time was up: “it has been two years since you vowed to struggle, to
criticize, and to transform (the school system), but now, you do not struggle,
criticize or transform... When you struggle, you are just carrying out armed
fights with each other!”³⁶ This led to the Red Guard movement
being disbanded and led to over 16 million urban youths being sent to the
countryside, while a small minority of them stayed in education under the
supervision of work teams.³⁷ The Centre did this not only as a
means of alleviating urban violence but also because it felt such an experience
of going amongst and integrating with the workers
and peasants would give
the urban youth the ideological education they needed.³⁸ This was not just a quick solution to alleviating the amount
of urban violence; this was seen as a key part of Cultural Revolution ideology
which envisaged a united and equal society under socialism.
The Cultural Revolution under threat
Lin Biao died in his attempted escape from China in 1971
after he was implicated in a plot to assassinate Mao. This clearly distressed
Mao: not only had Lin helped the progress of the Cultural Revolution, he had
also been Mao’s successor whose job it was to defend his legacy. However his
suspected betrayal had jeopardised both of these things.³⁹ Mao was now forced to reconsider the revolution, which led
to him rehabilitating many of the CCP officials who had been purged at the
start of the revolution.⁴⁰ Even Deng returned to the CCP in
1973, after illness had interfered with Premier Zhou’s ability to run
day-to-day affairs. Deng set about trying to reinvigorate the economy, with
considerable success.⁴¹ Revolutionary radicals like the Gang
of Four led by Jiang Qing felt cadres like Deng threatened the legacy of the
revolution due to the fact his policies emphasised the practical needs of the
economy over the radical Maoism which they had tried to spread throughout
Chinese society and culture. As a result they launched campaigns such as Criticise Lin, Criticise Confucius,
which oversaw the publishing of material that emphasised the regressive traits
of rightists and moderates, for example suggesting that they shared a lot in
common with Lin and with feudal tradition. This was done as a means to covertly
reveal the errors in pragmatic policies followed by cadres like Zhou and Deng.⁴² Mao however refrained from putting his full support behind
either faction, realising he needed pragmatic men to manage the country and
Maoist disciples who could reinforce his ideology in society.⁴³ This was reflected in Mao’s decision to choose Hua Guofeng
as his successor, who was according to cadre Xu Jingxian: “...acceptable to the
left as well as to the right”⁴⁴ Mao was unwilling to settle these
hostile contradictions within the CCP, leading to a lot internal tension which would
only be resolved after his death. In the mean time there would be a lot of
competition between these factions trying to further their opposing goals,
exacerbated by their uncertainty about their future in power.
Chapter 2-
Controlling Chinese Culture
The Cult of Mao
The Cult of Mao was well established before 1966, with
operatic films like The East Is Red
depicting him as a Supreme leader and saviour of the nation.¹ This helps explain why people were so willing to respond to
his calls to mobilize during the Cultural Revolution. Mao had always recognised
the importance of culture to a revolution: ‘Revolutionary culture is a powerful
revolutionary weapon for the broad masses of the people. It prepares the ground
ideologically before the revolution comes and is an important, indeed
essential, fighting front in the general revolutionary front during the
revolution.’² This is why he appointed the CCRG to oversee the production
and consumption of all culture in order to ensure that it conformed to the Maoist
rhetoric of supreme leadership, proletarian liberation and class struggle.³ During the Cultural Revolution Maoist imagery and ideology
was everywhere; there were bus tickets with messages like ‘the masses of people
have unlimited creative powers’, mirror tables inscribed with slogans like,
‘never forget class struggle’ and at least two billion badges with Mao’s face
on them.⁴ Daily rituals were performed by people as a means of
expressing their love and gratitude for Mao. Landsberger claims the following
recitation was commonly used by peasant families before every meal: “We
respectfully wish a long life to the reddest, reddest red sun in our hearts,
the great leader Chairman Mao.”⁵
In images of Mao it became preferable to stress Mao’s
solitary role in leading the revolution by deliberately not showing him
alongside other CCP leaders, for example Figure 1.1 is the original 1967 poster
created by amateur Red Guards and Figure 1.2 is the 1972 professional revision
of the same scene. Landsberger feels that Mao’s overwhelming presence in
society helped to confirm his demigod-like status in the eyes of many Chinese
people.⁶ At a time when Mao was attacking members of his own Party,
the strengthening of his cult of personality encouraged people to think that
Mao and not the Party was their guide.
|
|
Model Revolutionary Art
Jiang Qing had the authority to appoint the term ‘model’ to
any work of art she felt embodied the characteristics of the new revolutionary
culture. She would take existing works and scrutinise over every detail,
insisting on continuous revisions until it was worthy enough to be shown as
‘model’ works of art. Figure 1.3 is an official propaganda poster that shows
how Jiang presided over all theatrical culture and how she insisted on
productions praising the ideology of Mao which is why she encouraged ‘model’
works, as a means of teaching people what styles and themes were ideologically
correct. Clark in his review of these ‘model’ theatrical works notices that
there are many recurring themes. The lives of the male and female protagonists
are defined by the CCP, with none of them having a family because their duty to
promote and participate in the advancement of the revolution. Their
personalities change little as the story progresses; whatever difficulties they
face their revolutionary spirit endures and triumphs at the end. They remain
prominent figures throughout the performance, leading supporting characters
forward to victory. The heroes within these myths, Clark argues, were formed as
figures that all audience members should aspire to emulate in helping the
revolutionary cause.¹⁰ Once finalised, the scripts and
films of these operas were distributed nationwide so that everybody could see
them, which also gave both professional and amateur theatrical troupes the
chance to perform them.¹¹
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Jiang and other Leftists sought to promote new art works that
had something positive to say about the Cultural Revolution. They did this by
supporting amateur and professional artists who created works featuring new
revolutionary ideology or subjects. One way in which they showed their support
was by holding annual national fine art exhibitions between 1972 and 1975 which
displayed the work of such people. They wanted to show the world the creative
talents the masses had thanks to the Cultural Revolution.¹² Their support for training peasant artists like those from
Hu Xian allowed them to launch a propaganda campaign in 1973 to show how the
revolution had enabled such people to surpass the achievements of the academic
elites in making the art reach the highest purpose; of supporting the
revolution. This served the Leftist’s wider goal of criticising the elitism of
CCP leaders like Deng and Zhou during their Criticise
Lin, Criticise Confucius campaign.¹³ The Leftists with their Maoist
rhetoric believed that their influential role in cultural fields would enable
them to control the mentality of the masses and thus secure the Cultural
Revolution’s aim of creating a socialist society free from bourgeois elements.
Smashing the Old Fours
While it was important to support the new of the Cultural
Revolution it was also important to cleanse culture of harmful material. At the
beginning of the revolution Lin Biao emphasised the rhetoric of the need to
eliminate: “the old culture of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes
and... the old ideologies that serve to uphold and restore the system of
private ownership” in order to consolidate the socialist system.¹⁴ Red Guards carried out planned attacks which sought to
eradicate counter-revolutionary culture, for example one group of
schoolchildren called for an end to; ‘tight pants’, ‘classical books’ and
‘magicians’.¹⁵ Other groups began to
declare a need to change traditions in order to end the bourgeois influence
over them, such as a group of Shanghai workers who called from the Spring
Festival to be revolutionised.¹⁶ In Beijing alone, 4922 of the 6843
officially classified historical sites were damaged or destroyed in the autumn
of 1966, while 33,695 homes had been ransacked of their reactionary
possessions.¹⁷ In many cases Red Guards seemed to be reacting to the
destructive rhetoric without much foresight; Ken Ling reflected back with
bemusement of the purpose of the campaign: “...
I asked them (fellow Red Guards) what would be the next step after destroying
the old world, they either answered with an empty phrase ‘Foster a new world’
or not at all.”¹⁸ The CCP Centre had been able to
encourage a vigilant climate amongst the revolutionary masses, who now viewed
every object from an ideological perspective.
Chapter 3- The
Cultural Revolution in Chinese Society
The Revolutionary Masses
The emphasis on ideology meant that Chinese society could not
avoid being affected by the upheaval experienced by its political system during
the Cultural Revolution. The political and cultural dominance of Mao meant that
he was the only figure the people could unite behind. However the fact that the
CCP Centre had declared that it would actually be the revolutionary masses that
would independently advance the revolution forward meant there was nobody
carefully coordinating their actions.
Mao had empowered the masses in declaring that they should
strengthen their collective authority by seizing power from CCP cadres and
attacking bourgeois elements in society. Mao also made sure the CCP Centre did
not impede their efforts as is evident from statements made by the Minister of
Public Security: “I can’t say I agree
with the masses beating people to death. However, if the masses hate the bad
people so much that they can’t stop such beatings, we should not persist in
interfering.”¹ This vocal support and lack of hindrance
certainly made members of the revolutionary masses feel confident about their
ability to be agents in shaping the nation’s destiny. A Red Guard leader
declared that the revolution marked the peak of ‘extensive democracy’ in which people were free to express and
organise themselves as a means of advancing the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’²
There were those who were simply willing to capitalise on the
anarchic situation of the power struggles for their own interests. For example
Mobo Gao notes how the motivation for his local village cadre being purged was
not due to counter-revolutionary links, as was officially stated, but due to a
local peasant being angry that the cadre had slept with his wife.³ Other individuals sought to prove their revolutionary
credentials to higher revolutionary leaders, either as a means to express their
loyalty or show their social superiority. However during the revolution it was
not certain as to what these credentials were unless Mao or the CCP Centre made
it clear. CCP cadres had traditionally used labels such as ‘reds’ or ‘blacks’
to segregate people into class groups as a means of deciding who got preferable
treatment within units.⁴ Now empowered
members of the revolutionary masses began to use such labels to legitimise victimisation or
authority. For example the initial Red Guards, the children of high-level
cadres, used the slogan “a hero’s child
is a brave man, a reactionary’s child is a bastard” to show their inheritance-derived
superiority.⁵ Another Red Guard faction felt that this was ideologically
wrong due the Cultural Revolution rhetoric of power being in the hands of the
masses and not the elites. This led to rebel leader Kuai Dafu declaring that: “Revolutions are for the leftists only, and
rightists should not even think of shaking the sky!”⁶ In this case the CCP Centre supported the Leftists,
and led to them growing in confidence and numbers.⁷ However when no authorities intervened, groups would receive
no guidance in what was ideologically correct and therefore made their own
interpretations which could then lead to factional disputes. Ji Peng, a student
from Qinghua University, notes how this was the case at his University: “Both sides were confident in their ways of
carrying out the revolution and both sides actually found ammunition in Mao’s
statements.”⁸ This resulted in a factional
fighting in which each tried to outdo the other in radical conviction, leading
to one side being involved in house-raids of PLA officers while the other was
involved in the burning down of the British embassy.⁹ Clark likens such disputes to ‘a religious conflict’ in which
‘moral superiority is assumed by all sides’, which shows why neither side was
willing to back down or compromise unless they were told to by their idols of
affection.¹⁰ There were certainly those who felt empowered mentally at
the beginning of the revolution which is why they jumped at opportunities to
gain power, social elitism and revenge which were always justified in
accordance with Mao Zedong Thought.
Mao’s Lost Children
While there were sections of society who saw the Cultural
Revolution as providing them with a greater deal of opportunity, there were
many others who became disillusioned with the event.
The use of labels ensured that there would be a great deal of
victimisation during the revolution. Shengtian Zheng was excited about the new
possibilities offered to him as an artist at the beginning of the revolution;
however several months of incarceration in an ox-shed on the university campus
quickly drained his enthusiasm.¹¹ There were also those people who
lived in fear at the peak of the Smashing
of the Four Olds campaign, with reported cases of families in Beijing
guarding their property at night from potential destruction.¹² Millions of urban youths were sent to the countryside to be
re-educated by the peasantry where they learnt that reality was not necessarily
the happy and liberated story that propaganda images like figure 1.4 implied.
Gu Xiong remembers life in the countryside as being a hard struggle of survival
which was completely alien to city-folk like him. Being designated a member of
a ‘black family’ meant that Xiong would not be permitted to return to the city.
Xiong began to feel everything he had been taught under the CCP was meaningless
and he became very disillusioned in a life in the countryside that offered
little prospect.
The opening of relations with the USA and
re-introduction of previously banned cultural works in the 1970s led to Chinese
people viewing the west and tradition in a more favourable light. This had a
negative impact on the mentality many Chinese people had towards the radical
ideas of Jiang Qing and her Gang of Four, who were still trying to use cultural
works to present the Cultural Revolution as a triumph for Chinese communism.¹⁴ By 1976 many people were weary of the repetitive leftist
rhetoric with cynical sayings being used to describe the plot of the ‘model’
operas: “Company commander makes a mistake, Party secretary points out the
correct path: bad egg is revealed, the play’s over.”¹⁵ By the 1970s many people no longer regarded the Cultural
Revolution as representing a promising future, but instead as a reminder of unfulfilled
visions.
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Conclusion
After Mao’s death the leading Leftist faction, the Gang of
Four, was convicted of being a ‘counter-revolutionary clique’ by the CCP, which
shows how much Cultural Revolutionary radicals had become isolated within the
Party and society, despite their attempts to suggest otherwise in their
propaganda. After 1976 the CCP came out against the revolution which had
threatened many of them, blaming it on radicals like the gang but also on an
increasingly ’arrogant’ Mao for launching the revolution in the first place.¹ Mao had certainly become confident in his charismatic
dominance over the nation, believing that his calls for the masses to rise up
would result in them independently uniting to carry out his will. Many people
were willing to respond to his call and immediately set about spreading the
revolution throughout society as a way of proving their revolutionary verve.
However the fact Mao usually didn’t explicitly say what the right course of
action was in specific circumstances led to followers having to make their own
interpretations of what he wanted. As the amount of victims to the revolution
rose and when it became clear that the revolution was dividing society, people
became increasingly disillusioned that the early promise of a future of new
opportunity and a united China advancing would not emerge and therefore became
less inclined to accept the mentality promoted by its disciples.
Endnotes
Introduction
1. Important documents on the great proletarian
cultural revolution in China (Peking, 1970), p.126.
2.
Renmin
ribao, (2 April 1969), in R. MacFarquhar and M. Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution (Cambridge, 2006),
p.285.
3.
Ibid., pp.456-8.
4.
Mao Zedong, ‘“Seal the Coffin and Pass the
Verdict”’, in Schoenhals, M. (ed.), China’s
Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (London, 1996), p.293.
5.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.459.
6. Important documents on the great proletarian
cultural revolution in China (Peking, 1970), p.3.
7. People’s Daily, (10 April 1968), in X.
Gong, ‘The Logic of Repressive Collective Action: A Case Study of Violence in
the Cultural Revolution’, in K.Y. Law (ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust,
(Basingstoke, 2003), p.119.
8. B.
Erickson, ‘The Rent Collection Courtyard, Past and Present’, in ed. R. King
(ed.) Art in turmoil: the Chinese
Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, (Vancouver, 2010), pp.121.
Chapter 1- Mao and the CCP
1.
J. Ch’en, Mao
Papers: Anthology and Bibliography (London, 1970), p.139.
2. “Comment
on Comrade Ch’en Chen-jen’s Report on Staying at a Selected Spot”, Current Background, no.891 (8 October
1969), p.49, in H.Y. Lee, ‘Historical Reflections on the Cultural Revolution as
a Political Movement’, in K.Y. Law (ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust,
(Basingstoke, 2003), p.99.
3. S.
Wang, ‘Between Destruction and Construction: The First Year of the Cultural
Revolution’, in K.Y. Law (ed.), The
Chinese Cultural Revolution reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust, (Basingstoke,
2003), p.26.
4. Ibid., p.27.
5.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, pp.4-9.
6. Wang,
‘Destruction’, p.21.
7. Ibid., pp.27-8.
8.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.17.
9. Wang,
‘Destruction’, p.30.
10. Zhang
Yidong, ‘Comrade Wu Han, I Apologize!’ in Schoenhals, M. (ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not
a Dinner Party (London, 1996), p.329.
11. Important documents on the great proletarian
cultural revolution in China (Peking, 1970), p.p.107-112.
12. Ibid., pp.127-8.
13.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, pp.45-6.
14. Important documents on the great proletarian
cultural revolution in China (Peking, 1970), pp.120-1.
15.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, pp.53-7
16. Wang,
‘Destruction’, p.30.
17.
Liu Shaoqi
nianpu, 2: 640; Dazibao xuan, no.
2 (1966), p.23, in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.71.
18.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, pp.75-6.
19.
Mao Zedong
sixiang wan sui (1960-1967), p.165, in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.84.
20. Wang,
‘Destruction’, p.34.
21. Important documents on the great proletarian
cultural revolution in China (Peking, 1970), p.147.
22. Mao Zedong, ‘Bombard the Headquarters’, Peking Review, No.33, (11 August 1967),
in K.H. Fan (ed.), The Chinese Cultural
Revolution: Selected Documents (London, 1968), p.310.
23. Wang,
‘Destruction’, p.35-45.
24. Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hisang Wan-sui (Xianggang,
1967), pp.295,329, in H.Y. Lee, ‘Historical Reflections’, p.100.
25.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.163.
26. Important documents on the great proletarian
cultural revolution in China (Peking, 1970), p.147.
27. A.
Dirlik, ‘The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of Post-Mao Reform’, in K.Y.
Law (ed.), The Chinese Cultural
Revolution reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust, (Basingstoke, 2003),
p.166.
28. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking,
1966), pp.37-9.
29. Y.
Su, ‘Mass Killings in the Cultural Revolution: A Study of Three Provinces’, in
J. Esherick, P.G. Pickowicz, and A.G. Walder (ed.), The Chinese cultural revolution as history, (Stanford, 2006), pp.96-123.
30.
Mao Zedong, “4.28 jianghua” (Speech on April 28
(1969)), in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's
last revolution, p.296.
31. CCP
Centre, State Council, Central Military Commission, and Central Cultural
Revolution Group, ‘Decision to Provide the Revolutionary Masses of the Left
with the Firm Support of the People’s Liberation Army’, in Schoenhals, M.
(ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution,
1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (London, 1996), pp.52-53.
32. CCP
Centre and Central Cultural Revolution Group, ‘Opinions and Questions
Concerning the Reconsolidation, Revitalization, and Rebuilding of the Party
Organization’, in Schoenhals, M. (ed.), China’s
Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (London, 1996), pp.81-5.
33.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.160.
34. Red Flag Editorial, ‘On the
Revolutionary “Three-in-one” Combination’, in Schoenhals, M. (ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not
a Dinner Party (London, 1996), pp.59-65.
35. Su,
‘Mass Killings’, p.128.
36. X.
Zheng, ‘Passion, Reflection, and Survival: Political Choices of the Red Guards
at Qinghua University, June 1966- July 1968’, in J. Esherick, P.G. Pickowicz,
and A.G. Walder (ed.), The Chinese
cultural revolution as history, (Stanford,
2006), p.59.
37.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, pp.250-2.
38. Important documents on the great proletarian
cultural revolution in China (Peking, 1970), pp.190-3.
39.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.325.
40. Ibid., pp.339-45.
41. Ibid., pp.358-385.
42. Ibid., pp.347-372.
43. Ibid., pp.390-2.
44. “Xu
Jingxian de chubu jiefa jiaodai” (Xu Jiangxian’s Initial Exposé
and Testimony) (Shanghai, 1976), p.28, in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, p.417.
Chapter 2- Controlling Chinese
Culture
2.
Quotations,
p.299-300.
3. P. Clark, The Chinese Cultural Revolution: a history
(Cambridge, 2008), p.257.
4. M. Gao, The battle for China's past: Mao and the
Cultural Revolution (London, 2008), p.20-29.
5. S.R.
Landsberger, ‘The Deification of Mao: Religious Imagery and Practices during
the Cultural Revolution and Beyond’, in W.L. Chong (ed.), China's great
proletarian Cultural Revolution: master narratives and post-Mao
counternarratives, (Oxford, 2002), p.155.
6. Ibid., p.158.
7. J.F.
Andrews, ‘The Art of the Cultural Revolution’,
in R. King (ed.), Art in turmoil: the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, (Vancouver, 2010), pp.34-36.
8.
Ibid., pp.34-6.
9. The
invincible thought of Mao Zedong illuminates the stage of revolutionary art! , Crestock, http://www.crestock.com/blog/design/vibrant-chinese-propaganda-art--part-2-seven-intense-years-173.aspx (25 April
2011).
10.
Clark, Cultural
Revolution, pp.45-54.
11.
Ibid., pp. 75,
123.
12. M. Gao, Gao village: a portrait of rural life in
modern China (London, 1999), p.28.
13. R.
Croizier, ‘Hu Xian Peasant Painting: From Revolutionary Icon to Market
Commodity’, in R. King (ed.), Art in
turmoil: the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, (Vancouver, 2010), p.45.
14.
Lin Biao, ‘“Why a Cultural Revolution”’, in
Schoenhals, M. (ed.), China’s Cultural
Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (London, 1996), p.17.
15.
Beijing No.26 Middle School Red Guards, ‘One
Hundred Items for Destroying the Old and Establishing the New’, in Schoenhals,
M. (ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution,
1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (London, 1996), pp.212-222.
16.
Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebel General
Headquarters, ‘“Revolutionize the Spring Festival”’, in Schoenhals, M. (ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not
a Dinner Party (London, 1996), pp. 222-7.
17. D.D.
Ho, ‘To Protect and Preserve: Resisting the Destroy the Four Olds Campaign,
1966-1967’, in J. Esherick, P.G. Pickowicz, and A.G. Walder (ed.), The Chinese cultural revolution as
history, (Stanford, 2006), pp.64-5.
18.
K. Ling, The
Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese (New York, 1972), pp.55-7.
Chapter 3- The Cultural Revolution in
Chinese Society
1. X.
Gong, ‘The Logic of Repressive Collective Action: A Case Study of Violence in
the Cultural Revolution’, in K.Y. Law (ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust,
(Basingstoke, 2003), p.119.
2.
Tan Houlan, ‘Proletarian Dictatorship and
Proletarian Extensive Democracy’, in Schoenhals, M. (ed.), China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (London,
1996), pp. 150-155.
3.
Gao, Village,
p.145.
4. S.
Wang, ‘The Structural Sources of the Cultural Revolution’, in K.Y. Law (ed.), The Chinese Cultural Revolution
reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust, (Basingstoke, 2003), pp.64-72
5.
Wang, ‘Destruction’, pp.33-6.
6.
Zheng, ‘Qinghua University’, p.44.
7.
Ibid., pp.40-58.
8.
Ibid., p.56.
9.
Ibid., p.57.
10.
Clark, Cultural
Revolution, p.19.
11. S.
Zheng, ‘Brushes Are Weapons: An Art School and Its Artists’, in R. King (ed.) Art in turmoil: the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, 1966-76, (Vancouver, 2010), p.99.
12.
Ho, Protect
and Preserve, p.80.
13. G.
Xiong, ‘When We Were Young: Up to the Mountains, Down to the Villages’, in R.
King (ed.) Art in turmoil: the Chinese
Cultural Revolution, 1966-76, (Vancouver, 2010), pp.107-117.
14.
MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, Mao's last revolution, pp.338-358.
15.
Go among
the workers, peasants and soldiers and into the thick of the struggle!, Cultural
Revolution Site, http://www.zitantique.com/cr1.html (28 April 2011).
Conclusion
1.
Resolution
on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the
People’s Republic of China (Adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the
Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981),
Chinese Communism Subject Archive, http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm
(24 April 2011).
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