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The image above provides a visual illustration of a Marxist
view of Tsarist Russia, one in which soldiers and sailors and other lower-class
members were the foundations of the society, despite this they lacked rights
and were exploited by those above them. They had no vote or say in national
politics, but they had still been fighting a war in the name of it since 1914.
The February and October Revolutions of 1917 changed all this. The
lower-classes were exposed to new possibilities and new ideas of revolution and
freedom which were being offered to them by the political opponents of Tsarism.
As Wade puts it, ‘The February Revolution
had transformed the formerly submissive soldiers and sailors into a
self-conscious political force with their own aspirations and organization.’² The war continued to consume their lives and was the cause
for a lot of suffering in the front and the rear. The general outlook the
soldiers and sailors had was influenced by the war and the revolutionary ideas
that emerged after February; these things motivated their military conduct
during both revolutions in which they decided whether or not to support change.
By analysing the letters and resolutions written in 1917 one
can see how the soldiers and sailors viewed their situation. Documentation like
reports and appeals written by authority figures will also be studied to get an
impression of the more general trends emerging at the time. The voices of all
soldiers will not be heard in these written documents because only those who
had a direct agenda would bother to write to authority figures or appeal to groups.³ Modern historians like Ashworth, Ferro, Wade and Wildman all
appreciate the importance of both factors in stimulating the behaviour of military
personnel. Their arguments and studies will be referred to in order to provide
this discussion with in-depth research that will put these documents into a
wider historical context which should help in determining their significance.
The February Revolution came as a result of a spontaneous
uprising by the Petrograd workers, which the Petrograd garrison refused to put
down and later joined which forced Tsar Nicolas II to abdicate. Ashworth rejects traditional Marxist arguments
that suggest that the Petrograd garrison had political motivations based around
class consciousness when they decided to support the uprising. Instead he convincingly
argues that they saw this as a chance to express their war weary feelings by
not supporting the regime that got them into the war, therefore securing a
change of leadership and offering their loyalty to any group who would improve
their military situation.⁴ This was certainly the view of this
soldier, who wrote to the Soviet saying, ‘for
the troops a change in regime betokened the end of the war.’⁵ As the table
below shows many soldiers did support the setup of democratic institutions from
the start which is probably more of a means of bringing military change as can
be seen in the number of resolutions regarding the war and military discipline.
Only a minority of soldiers are concerned with the need for a social revolution
involving greater equality, education and land redistribution, which were major
concerns for non-combatants.
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The reason for such limited political vision was because most
soldiers lacked experience in political affairs due to the fact they were
forbidden from joining political parties and demonstrations and until Order No
1 had no organization looking out for their interests. It is little surprise
that with their new democratic freedoms they were uncertain what to do with it,
with some soldiers asking the government to enlighten them on political
matters:
‘Now the chains have been broken and we are
now free, yet we remain as ignorant and helpless as ever. Before long there
will be a Constituent Assembly. We do not want to be mute and passive voters
and deputies. We want to know what this or that form of rule holds in store or
us.’⁷
It is highly unlikely that soldiers were influenced by
revolutionary ideologies when they decided to support the February Revolution
due to the limited amount of political knowledge they possessed, whereas they
were all weary of war and were willing to support the February Revolution in
order to end it.
Soldiers began to realise peace could not be declared
immediately, because the Central Powers would be determined annex Russian
lands. Appeals were made to armies to stay at their posts in order to defend
Russia, ‘We will not disgrace
ourselves by ceding our freedom, our happiness, to the enemy. Now we are
expecting you to make an all-out effort for the defence.’⁸ The soldiers could appreciate this, they had acquired new freedoms
of being able to vote for representatives in military committees and local
Soviets to protect their interests and they realised that defeat to the
autocratic Central Powers could result in Russia losing more than land. They
did not wish to fight anymore but they did not want the last three years of
suffering to be for nothing, so many felt compelled to defend Russia and their
own liberties.⁹ It is for this reason that Order No
1 tries defend both self-discipline and liberty:
‘In
the ranks and during their performance of the duties of the service, soldiers
must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and the
ranks, in their political, general civic, and private life, soldiers cannot in
any way be deprived of those rights which all citizens enjoy.’¹⁰
Soldiers agreed to follow this order, especially as it
coincided with the policy put forward by Tsereteli of ‘Revolutionary
Defencism’. This policy was popular with soldiers because the ultimate goal was
establishing a peace that preserved Russia and the revolutionary liberties of
the people and until that time troops would only have to defend Russia, they
would not have to risk their lives to expand her.¹¹ This suited the demands of military
men perfectly, who saw no point in offensive manoeuvres, like the soldiers serving
under Fedor Stepun who responded to aggressive orders from the General Staff by
saying, ‘ “What the devil do we need
another Hilltop for, when we can make peace at the bottom?”’¹² This consensus was maintained for several
months in which most troops stuck or returned to their posts so they would not
betray their country and rights to the enemy.¹³
However
no matter how well the war went or however much soldiers saw it as their duty; the
war still drained their energy. Soldiers did choose to stay at their posts but
only because they feared the implications if they lost.¹⁴ Over the year
soldiers began to wonder if it was really worth it, soldiers appealed to
Kerensky in August feeling that defeat was inevitable anyway so why prolong the
suffering, ‘... put an end to the slaughter. Only by
doing this can you keep the enemy from penetrating deep inside Russia and save
us both from this invasion and from starvation.’¹⁵ Reports suggest that such desires to not fight were pretty
widespread by October and had resulted in a decline in discipline and a rise in
desertion. Orders were being disobeyed; on the Western front there was an
incident in which, ‘over eight-thousand
soldiers who were to be transferred to the front demanded to be sent home
instead.’¹⁶ In the rear in places like Stavka order seemed to have
completely deteriorated, ‘Drunken
soldiers are rioting and shooting at their fellow soldiers.’¹⁷
Disorder
and discontent was definitely spreading throughout Russia between February and
October. However many remained at their posts and while military committees made
louder demands for a speedy peace it would be ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’. This meant it would
take a while as Russia would need to make agreements with the enemy in which
Russia would stop fighting but would lose nothing. Committees realised that
they needed, ‘to supply the army with all
necessities... since the demobilization can proceed only gradually.’¹⁸ Many
realised they had a duty to defend Russia still, however many were becoming
weary of the revolutionary government, military men including those who wrote
the resolution above were becoming less confident about serving under them
saying, ‘The indecisive policy of the
government is accelerating the crisis.’
It
was the soldiers and sailors who had secured the February Revolution and they
realised this, one resolution states that the authority of their leaders
depended on them and, ‘If they do not yield to the people, the
people must sweep them aside with one mighty motion.’¹⁹ Because of this and the fact the Provisional government only
had executive powers it had to create policies which the people liked or accepted
in order for them to be carried out by the people.²⁰ The government did struggle to enforce its will on people
because they lacked coercive state organs. For instance military officers
usually had to comply with the demands of their men in order to make them obey
orders, for instance General Vertsinsky liberalized army conditions in
accordance with Order No 1 saying, ‘...introducing
inevitable changes in the life of the corps, it helped to prevent the wild
excesses which took place elsewhere.’²¹
‘Wild excesses’, is a reference to the
removal of more conservative military officers from their posts, such as the murdered
and deposed Kronstadt officers who had tried to prevent revolutionary change affecting
their base in February.²² Despite attempts of several ministers and officers to
win the favour of the lower-orders, the view the soldiers and sailors had of
these groups deteriorated over the year. There had often been mistrust for
officers amongst the lower-orders due to their links to the Tsarist past and their
attempts to restore obedience, however by September such views had escalated, ‘We cannot defend the country under the
command of the general staff. We don’t trust them anymore. We see them as
blatant counterrevolutionaries...’²³ Such extremities even resulted in the murder
of senior officers later in the year in places like Vyborg, one witness
understood the reason for this, ‘I am aware that they wanted to crush
Kornilov’s lackeys and weaken them, but no one will achieve anything doing it
this way.’²⁴ It is true that mistrust of senior
officers had been mounting over the summer months due to attempts to
reintroduce coercive measures to army discipline like capital punishment, and
once General Kornilov attempted to march on Petrograd the lower-orders could no
longer tolerate them- they were counterrevolutionaries.
Even
after the demonstrations against them during the July Days, the Provisional
Government continued to have the ‘unconditional confidence’ of some soldiers
who believed they still embodied the revolutionary ideologies of February and
felt they were still capable of bringing liberty, equality and fraternity to
Russia.²⁵ However the government made some catastrophic decisions such as
ordering an offensive against the enemy in June. Many soldiers refused to obey,
‘We must end the war no matter what, and
if they want an offensive, then we’ll mount an offensive against the
capitalists and the bourgeois that are drowning us and killing us and our
freedom.’²⁶ An offensive went against the will of many soldiers which is
why many avoided it, while those who did were routed by the enemy leaving the survivors
disillusioned with the government due to them increasing their war suffering.²⁷
The government also tried to provide more order to society and the military in
the summer by reintroducing harsh criminal punishments like the death-penalty
for soldiers, which greatly angered them as it seemed their February gains were
being abandoned, ‘The
rights of the soldier are falling by the wayside, so is the reinforcement of
the rights of freedom, and in their place Articles 129 and 131 are being
advanced once again.’²⁸
It was during these months that Bolshevism was able to
influence the revolutionary ideologies of soldiers. The Bolsheviks championed
their struggle, saying they could provide the desired peace and rights which
the Provisional Government had failed to do. In doing so the Bolsheviks were
able to politicise military men by saying the war was an ‘imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of the government’ and
was not in their proletarian interests.²⁹ The
Bolsheviks promoted the notion that the bourgeois government and General Staff
were counterrevolutionaries who were retreating from revolutionary rights so
they could restore discipline and order, vindicating their point by referring
to the offensive, conservative policies and Kornilov Affair.³⁰ The Provisional Government was failing the desires of the military
men and as a result many were persuaded into following more radical policies ‘... the provisional government promised
during the first days to give the poor people their freedom but they didn’t. We
are little by little going over entirely to the side of the Bolsheviks.’³¹ ‘All Power to the Soviets’ was a revolutionary
ideology the Bolsheviks endorsed which also pleased the lower-orders, for the
Soviet was held in high-esteem by them due to the fact they were elected to
represent their interests.³² By October many military men had lost all enthusiasm for the Provisional
Government, many committees now wrote resolutions supporting the seizer of
power by the Soviets as a way of representing popular opinions , ‘We consider the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasant’s Deputies to be the sole organ
reflecting the will and voice of the people.’³³
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The results from the Constituent Assembly show how dominant
socialist ideas amongst military men were by the end of 1917, with both the
Social-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks earning around 40% of their vote each.
Both parties upheld the political and social revolutionary ideologies the
military men shared such as democratizing military service, redistributing the
land, transferring power to the Soviets and seeking peace. The Bolsheviks were
able to topple the Provisional Government in October not because they were the
most popular party but due to the fact the Provisional Government lacked any
mass support, while the lower-classes at least sympathised with the decisive
action of the Bolsheviks to remove obstacles of the socialist revolution and
therefore allowed this revolutionary vanguard to seize power unheeded.³⁶ This was certainly the view of some soldiers like those of
the Electrotechnical Battalion who stated in a resolution, ‘We declare that we are not all Bolsheviks, all of us stand as one for
the unified program of actions and will follow without hesitation this party,
which will move decisively and relentlessly toward the stated goal of total
emancipation for all labourers.’³⁷
In February war weariness made the military men of Russia
feel that they could no longer live under Tsarism and by refusing to comply
anymore they were able force Nicolas to abdicate. The democratic revolution
changed the way the people viewed their government; leaders now had to prove
their legitimacy to the people or else be removed by them. Military men
embraced revolutionary ideologies, at first this universally included political
desires to be treated as sovereign citizens. Later on a significant number of
them had increasingly radical views about bringing a socialist revolution to
Russia which involved policies like redistributing land and vesting all power
to the Soviets. However the Provisional Government failed to implement such
revolutionary ideas, instead seeming to adopt conservative values due to
influence from the General Staff and bourgeoisie. The masses were all opposed
with a return to Tsarism and military men either began to lose faith in the government
or regarded them as counterrevolutionaries. The Bolsheviks were greatly
influential in exposing the lack of popular legitimacy in government actions to
military men, losing the government the popular, military support it
desperately needed in order to run the war and country. Lenin politically radicalised
many military men by showing them that this imperialistic war they were sacrificing
their lives for was not to their benefit and the ultimate example of bourgeois
exploitation. This helped create open hostility to the leaders, officers and
bourgeoisie; because this asserted that they were only interested in their own
prosperity and glory and not the popular desires for revolution and peace.
Endnotes
1. A.Radakov,
‘The Autocratic System (1917)’, Seventeen Moments in History, www.soviethistory.org (6 December 2010)
2. R.Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917 (London, 2003), p.111
3. M.D.Steinberg, Voices of revolution, 1917 (New Haven, 2001), p.3
4. T.Ashworth, ‘Soldiers not Peasants: The Moral basis of the
February Revolution of 1917’, Sociology,
26 (1992), p.468
5. ’Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v rossii posle sverzheniia samoderzhaviiad’,
in M.Ferro, ‘The Russian Soldier in 1917:
Patriotic, Undisciplined and Revolutionary’, Slavic Review
30 (1971), p.491
6. M.Ferro, ‘The Russian Soldier in 1917:
Patriotic, Undisciplined and Revolutionary’, Slavic Review
30 (1971), p.512
7. Document 27 in M.D. Steinberg (ed.), Voices of Revolution, 1917 (New Haven,
2001), pp. 114-115
8. Document 23 in Steinberg , Voices, pp. 107-8
9. Ferro,
‘Russian Soldier’, p.492
10. ‘‘Order No.1’, 1 March 1917 (14 March
1917)’,Seventeen Moments in History, www.soviethistory.org (6 December 2010).
11. Wade, Russian Revolution, pp.67-73
12. F.Stepun, ‘Byvshee i nebyvsbeesya’, in A.K.Wildman, ‘The
February Revolution in the Russian Army’, Soviet
Studies, 22 (1970),
p.10
13. A.K.Wildman, ‘The February Revolution in the Russian Army’, Soviet Studies, 22 (1970), p.17
14. Steinberg, Voices, p.50
15. Document 78 in Steinberg , Voices, p. 218
16. ‘Army
Intelligence Report for September 19-30 (13 October 1917)’, Seventeen Moments in History, www.soviethistory.org (6 December 2010).
17. ‘Petrograd
Telegraph Agency, Condition of the Troops In the Rear (1917)’, Seventeen Moments in History, www.soviethistory.org (6 December 2010).
18. Kozhevnikov,
‘Resolution of the Army Committee of the Western Front. October, 30 1917 (12
November 1917)’, Seventeen Moments in
History, www.soviethistory.org (6
December 2010).
19. Document 81 in Steinberg , Voices, pp. 220-225
20. Wade, Russian Revolution, pp.56-7
21. E.A. Vertsinsky, ‘God revolyutsii’, in A.K.Wildman, ‘The
February Revolution in the Russian Army’, Soviet
Studies, 22 (1970),
p.22
22. D.A.Longley, ‘Officers and Men: A Study of the
Development of Political Attitudes among the Sailors of the Baltic Fleet in
1917’, Soviet Studies 25 (1973), pp. 29-30
23. Document 81 in Steinberg , Voices, pp. 220-225
24. Document 80 in Steinberg , Voices, p. 219
25. Document 69 in Steinberg , Voices, pp. 201-202
26. Document 33 in Steinberg , Voices, p.122
27. Wade, Russian Revolution, pp.182-3
28. Document 36 in Steinberg , Voices, pp.122-3
29. V.Lenin,
‘The Task of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution. April 4,1917 (17 April
1917)’, Seventeen Moments in History, www.soviethistory.org (6 December 2010).
30. Wade, Russian Revolution, pp.206-9
31. Document 75 in Steinberg , Voices, p.213-4
32. Wade, Russian Revolution, p.209
33. Document 87 in Steinberg , Voices, p.232
34. L.Protasov, ‘The All-Russia
Constituent Assembly and the Democratic Alternative’, in R.Wade, Revolutionary Russia: New Approaches
(London, 2004), pp.243-267
35. Wade, Russian Revolution, pp.208-215
36. N.Lowe, Mastering Modern World History (4th
edn, Basingstoke, 2005), pp.347-350
37. Document 115 in Steinberg , Voices, p.283-284
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